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The Pareto principle is often viewed as a mild requirement compatible with a variety of value 
judgements. In particular, it is generally thought that it can accommodate diﬀerent views on the 
desirable degree of equality. We show that this is generally not true in intertemporal models 
where some uncertainty prevails. To do so, we formalize the concept of inequality aversion. We 
show that diﬀerent degrees of inequality aversion are not possible in typical models of time-
consistent dynamic decision under uncertainty. 
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It has long been recognized that adherence to the Pareto principle may have distribu-
tional consequences. In particular, the set of Pareto optimal allocations may not contain
any egalitarian allocation, so that equality and optimality are impossible to reconcile.
Philosophers, especially those adhering to the egalitarian tradition, have intensively de-
bated as to whether inequalities should be permitted in such cases, or the Pareto principle
abandoned.
Although there is no possible dispute as to the fact that the Pareto principle may
constrain the Social Planner in his willingness to achieve equality, it is also widely believed
that adherence to the Pareto principle does not make all concerns for inequality irrelevant.
The set of Pareto optimal allocations is typically thought of as being rich enough for the
planner to be left with a non trivial choice where his preferences for equality may matter.
Stated dierently, it is usually believed that accepting the Pareto principle does not
prevent diverse degrees of inequality aversion from being expressed.
This conventional wisdom about the limited restrictiveness of the Pareto principle is
perfectly correct in deterministic and static cases. The aim of this paper is to show that it
does not extend to realistic cases, where dynamics and uncertainty are inevitably at play.
We show that in such cases adhering to the Pareto principle generally leaves practically no
room for redistributive considerations. More precisely, we prove that, except in particular
cases, two Paretian social observers with consequentialist and time consistent preferences
cannot express dierent but comparable concerns for equality. Given a social observer
with Paretian, consequentialist and time consistent preferences, it is impossible to nd
another Paretian, consequentialist and time consistent social observer who would exhibit
more (or less) aversion to inequality.
To grasp the intuition behind the result, imagine a population of identical individuals.
In period one, all these individuals face the same decision problem, which consists of
making a choice under uncertainty, knowing that the consequence of one's choice will
have no impact on the others' well being. All individuals being identical they are willing
to take identical decisions. Since each individual decision has no impact on the others,
a Paretian social planner has no other possibility than deciding for everybody what they
would have decided for themselves. In particular the planner's decision is independent
of whether individuals' fates are determined by a single lottery that apply to all, or by
independent individual lotteries. These two cases would however generate very dierent
degrees of inequalities in period 2. But the planner, being Paretian, has to accept the
levels of inequality arising from individuals' preferred choices. He is thus left with no
possibility to express his own judgement about the socially optimal level of inequality:
the acceptance of the Pareto principle ex-ante prevents inequality considerations ex-post.
Alternatively, one grasp the intuition of the result by considering Diamond (1967)'s
criticism of Harsanyi's (1955) theorem. A simple way to obtain time consistency in a
dynamic setting involves relying on the expected utility framework. Harsanyi (1955)
proved that the only way to get a Paretian aggregation of preferences within the expected
utility framework consists in having a social utility function which is an ane combination
of individuals' utility functions. Diamond (1967) argued that this form of preference
aggregation annihilates the possibility of redistributing utility.
Diamond's remark, as well as the simple example we suggested above, motivated our
research. Our aim was to show that, far form being conned to particular cases (as in
the rst example), or conned to a particular setting (expected utility framework, in the
1Diamond-Harsanyi controversy), these insightful examples are the mere expression of a
general impossibility result inherent in social choice in dynamic settings, whose formal-
ization is precisely the object of our paper. We will show indeed that considerations of
inequality aversion become irrelevant when the planner adheres to the Pareto principle
while his dynamic preferences satisfy some basic conditions - namely time consistency
and consequentialism. While egalitarians pointed at the Pareto principle as a potential
obstacle to reach full equality, the Pareto principle has much stronger consequences: it
basically forbids the expression of dierent concern for equality
The present paper relates two lines of research: inequality aversion, on the one hand,
and dynamic choice under uncertainty, on the other hand. As such it uses contributions
from two broad but almost disconnected elds of literature. We borrow from the works
by Yaari (1969), Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974), Nielsen (1988), Jewitt (1989) Grant
and Quiggin (2005) and Bosmans (2007) to provide a general denition of comparative
inequality aversion.1 Concerning dynamic choice under uncertainty, we use the huge
literature on the link between consequentialism, linearity in mixture and time consistency.
Among the most relevant references are Hammond (1981), Myerson (1981), Johnsen and
Donaldson (1985) and Sarin and Wakker (1994, 1998). Two important conclusions of
this literature are the following: rst, linearity in mixture is a very usual and practical
way of ensuring the time consistency of choices (Hammond, 1981; Myerson, 1981). It
is for this reason that one part of our paper will focus on preferences that are linear in
mixture. Second, in settings which are not embedded with a natural mixture operation
(e.g. when considering a nite set for the state of the world), the assumption of time
consistency is -in a consequentialist approach- akin to a separability assumption which
gives a particular structure to the representation of dynamic preferences (Johnsen and
Donaldson, 1985). Consequentialism and time consistency are in fact at the heart of the
folding back technique which is almost universally adopted in recursive choices (Sarin and
Wakker, 1994, 1998).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the
setting and provide a general denition of inequality aversion. In Section 3, we consider the
possibility of dierent degrees of inequality aversion when social observers are Paretian.
We rst consider the case where they have preferences that are linear in mixture. We show
that it is impossible to have two Paretian social observers with one being more inequality
averse than the other. We then study a more general set up where the choice space does
not permit mixtures. Assuming time consistency of choices, we obtain a similar result:
a Paretian social observer cannot be more inequality averse than another one after the
initial period. Section 4 concludes.
2 Inequality aversion
Since the pioneering works by Atkinson (1970) and Kolm (1976a, 1976b), the degree of
inequality aversion has been identied as a key element for policy assessment. Several
papers have provided characterizations of the degree of inequality aversion for specic
models. Atkinson (1970) and Kolm (1976a, 1976b) are the basic references in the case
of additive separable social evaluation functions. Donaldson and Weymark (1980) and
1Note that all these papers except that of Bosmans deal with risk or uncertainty aversion. There is
however a direct link with the concept of inequality aversion we will use in the paper.
2Yaari (1988) derive characterizations in the case of Yaari social evaluation functions (which
generalize the Gini evaluation function).
However, in order to obtain general results, comparison of inequality aversion should
be independent of the acceptance of a particular model of social choice. Moreover, a
general denition should not be contingent on a particular structure for the set of social
consequences. In particular, to be relevant in complex settings (as with the case of
dynamic choice under uncertainty) it is necessary to consider a more general problem
than the allocation of a single transferable commodity between individuals.
Similar considerations are found in the literature on choice under uncertainty. While
the seminal contributions of Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965) were restricted to von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern (vNM) preferences over the set of monetary lotteries, it soon
appeared necessary to have a denition of comparative risk aversion that would neither
rely on the expected utility framework, nor be restricted to the case of unidimensional lot-
teries. The contributions by Yaari (1969), Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974), Nielsen (1988),
Jewitt (1989) and Grant and Quiggin (2005) - in the case of uncertainty aversion - worked
in that direction.
The common principle in these contributions is to associate a relation \more risk
averse than"(which involves comparing preferences) with any relation \riskier than"(which
involves comparing random elements). More precisely, given a relation \riskier than"a
decision maker A is said to be less (or no more) risk averse than B if any x which is riskier
than y and preferred to y by B is also preferred to y by A. The advantage is that such
a denition does not involve assuming a particular model of choice under uncertainty,
and that it can be applied to complex domains of consequences (as in Nielsen, 1988, who
considers general measurable sets).
Transposition to social choice for comparisons of inequality aversion is explicit in
Bosmans (2007). The same route will be taken in the present paper. However, a dif-
ference will be that - for reasons explained below - we shall consider the relation \more
unequal than" introduced by Hammond (1976). This relation, which was not considered
by Bosmans, corresponds to the notion of single crossing of the cumulative distribution
functions introduced by Jewitt (1989).
2.1 The setting
We consider society composed of two individuals, denoted 1 and 2. The set of all conceiv-
able (or feasible) social alternatives is denoted by X. It is a general set with no particular
structure. We assume that each individual i 2 f1;2g is endowed with a preference relation
i on X.
We aim at comparing social preferences over X in terms of inequality aversion. Dis-
cussing matters related to inequality involves being able to (ordinally) compare the well
being of the two individuals. Indeed, it would be meaningless to pretend taking into
account the inequality of a social alternative, if one is not even able to tell which of the
two individuals is better o.
We will therefore dene a Social Observer ("SO", hereafter) as being a utility function
dened on X, allowing social alternatives to be ranked, and an interpersonal comparison
function allowing the well-beings of individuals in the society to be compared. More
precisely:
Denition 1 A Social Observer is the combination of:
31. A social evaluation function W : X ! R.
2. An interpersonal utility function U : X  f1;2g ! R.
The social evaluation function W orders social alternatives. It represents the prefer-
ences of the SO. The interpersonal utility function compares the relative situations of the
two individuals in alternative states of aairs. The inequality U(x;i)  U(^ x;j) denotes
the ethical judgement that individual i is better-o in the social alternative x than j in
the social alternative ^ x.
Since we have dened SOs as being utility functions (and not preference relations) it
will be useful to have the following denition:
Denition 2 Two functions V A : K ! R and V B : K ! R are ordinally congruent if
there exists an increasing function  : R ! R such that
V A = (V B)
The above denition can apply either to SOs' social evaluation functions (when
K = X) or to their interpersonal utility functions (when K = X  f1;2g). Two SOs
with ordinally congruent social evaluation functions have the same preferences over social
alternatives. Two SOs with ordinally congruent interpersonal evaluation functions always
concur when comparing the individuals' welfare.
If we endorse individualistic views, restrictions have to be placed upon the social eval-
uation function and the interpersonal utility function. The SO's assessment of individual
i's welfare must conform with i's point of view. Moreover, the social evaluation function
must accord with the Pareto principle which states that the unanimous agreement of
individuals has to be respected. We will call an SO that satises these two properties
`Paretian'.
Denition 3 An SO (W;U) is Paretian if:
1. His interpersonal utility function is such that U(:;i) represents the preferences of
individual i:
U(x;i)  U(^ x;i) () x i ^ x 8x; ^ x 2 X; 8i = 1;2
2. There exists a strictly increasing function W such that the social evaluation function






42.2 Comparative inequality aversion
In order to implement the procedure by Bosmans (2007) for dening a relation \more
inequality averse than" one rst needs to dene a relation \more unequal than". Bosmans
explored three denitions. One is the M-concept where x is at least as unequal as ^ x
if and only if ^ x describes a situation with perfect equality. The two other concepts are
based respectively on Lorenz domination and on relative dierentials quasi-ordering, both
applied to the distribution of the U(:;i).
None of the three denitions seemed adequate to us. The M-concept is, as its name
suggests, extremely minimalist, and leads to a very weak notion of comparative inequal-
ity aversion. In practice, the M-concept aords interesting results only when combined
with additional assumptions on the form of the social evaluation function (e.g. by as-
suming additive separability). The two other concepts are more constraining, but have
the drawbacks of not being ordinal, in the sense that two SOs with ordinally congruent
interpersonal utility functions would not necessarily agree on inequality comparisons.
Rather, we prefer to use the notion introduced by Hammond (1976) which allows
social alternatives to be compared even if none of them is characterized by full equality.
Denition 4 Given an interpersonal evaluation function U; a social alternative x 2 X is
said to be at least as unequal as ^ x 2 X, denoted xIU^ x, if, for a pair (i;j) 2 f(1;2);(2;1)g:
U(x;i)  U(^ x;i)  U(^ x;j)  U(x;j)
or
U(x;i)  U(^ x;j)  U(^ x;i)  U(x;j)
In addition, x 2 X is more unequal than ^ x 2 X, denoted xb IU^ x, if there is at least one
strict inequality between the rst and second terms or the third and fourth terms in the
above inequations.
It is clear that the relations IU and b IU are transitive. Moreover, IU and b IU are ordinal
concepts in the sense that if V = (U) for an increasing function  then IU = IV and
b IU = b IV .
We can now implement Bosmans's procedure to obtain a relation of comparative
inequality aversion.
Denition 5 An SO (WA;UA) is at least as inequality averse as an SO (WB;UB), if
and only if, for any x 2 X:
n




^ x 2 X : ^ xb IUB x and WB(^ x)  WB(x)
o
From the denition it is possible to derive characterization results in specic settings
5(additively separable, Yaari or Quiggin social welfare functions, and so forth).2 But the
great advantage of Denition 3 is that it does not depend on a specic model of social
evaluation, in the same way as Yaari's (1969) denition is not restricted to the expected
utility model. Denition 3 is consistent with but more general than views expressed
in the literature on inequality measurement (for instance Atkinson, 1970, Atkinson and
Bourguignon, 1982, Donaldson and Weymark, 1980, or Yaari, 1988).
Our very general denition of inequality aversion can be applied to complicated con-
sequence domains, for instance dynamic settings involving uncertainty. We are therefore
able to compare SO's inequality aversion in these settings.
3 Time Consistency, consequentialism and Inequality Aver-
sion
There is a broad literature on what should be the desirable properties of an SO's pref-
erences in a dynamic context. A common assumption is that of time consistency, which
states that if an SO thinks that he will take a given action under certain circumstances,
he will actually stick to his plan if these circumstances do occur. Another common as-
sumption, central in the utilitarian doctrine, is that the SO should be consequentialist, in
the sense that his preferences regarding the future should be independent of what could
have happened in other circumstances.
The fact that a well-behaved SO should be time consistent is not very controversial.
The assumption of consequentialism has however been criticized in several instances,
most notably by Diamond (1967), Machina (1989) and Epstein and Segal (1992). Yet,
in dynamic settings, consequentialism remains endorsed by most theorists. Defenses of
consequentialism have been proposed by Hammond (1988), Sarin and Wakker (1994,
1998), and to some extend by Fleurbaey (2007).
It is not our purpose, in the present paper, to debate about the desirability of assuming
time consistency and consequentialism. Our purpose is rather to emphasize that these
assumptions combined with the Pareto principle turn out to have signicant implications
in terms of inequality aversion.
We will consider two dierent settings. In Section 3.1 we will explore the case of
preferences that are linear in mixture. Several papers, including Hammond (1988), or
Myerson (1981), argue that this property is necessary to guarantee time consistency. In
the context of consequentialist sequential choices, several papers have actually shown
that time consistency and the independence condition which corresponds to the linearity
in mixture assumption are closely related (notable references are: Chew and Epstein,
1989; Karni and Schmeidler, 1991; Sarin and Wakker, 1994; Sarin and Wakker, 1998;
and Grant, Kajii and Polak, 2000). More precisely, it has been shown in consequentialist
frameworks that time consistency combined with some other property3 implies either the
independence condition or the expected utility model.
2For more details in a unidimensional setting, see Grant and Quiggin (2005).
3The other property can be any one of the following: 1/ timing indierence (Chew and Epstein, 1989);
2/ reduction of compounded lotteries (Karni and Schmeidler, 1991); 3/ interchangeability of consecu-
tive decision nodes (Sarin and Wakker, 1994); 4/ sequential consistency (Sarin and Wakker, 1998); 5/
preference for an early resolution of uncertainty plus other minor conditions (Grant, Kajii and Polak,
2000).
6Moreover, the wide majority of choice models under risk and/or uncertainty fulll an
assumption of (possibly partial) linearity in mixture. Examples are the expected utility,
the subjective expected utility  a la Anscombe and Auman (1963) or, in a restricted sense,
the dynamic model by Kreps and Porteus (1978). More recent models such as Maxmin
Expected Utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), the Choquet Expected Utility of
Schmeidler (1989) and more generally the invariant biseparable preferences of Ghirardato,
Maccheroni and Marinacci (2004) also satisfy a form of partial linearity of mixture, and
therefore will t in this part. We will indeed show that partial linearity in mixture makes
it possible to derive a general impossibility result about inequality aversion.
Still, especially when considering a relatively poor information context (like a nite set
for the state of the world), it is known since Johnsen and Donaldson (1985) that linearity
in mixture is not required to obtain time consistency. In Section 3.2, we will therefore
follow the approach of Johnsen and Donaldson and show that a similar impossibility result
can be derived.
3.1 Linearity in mixture
In this section, the temporal dimension of the decision problem need not be made explicit,
since only the assumption of linearity in mixture will be needed for our results. We will
simply assume agents have preferences over an abstract set X on which an operation of
mixture is dened. To apply our result to particular settings, such as situations of risk,
uncertainty, or temporal risk  a la Kreps and Porteus (1978), one only needs to consider
the appropriate set X.
A mixture operation  on X is an operation, which for all x and ^ x belonging to X




0x  1^ x = ^ x;
x  (1   )^ x = (1   )^ x  x for all x; ^ x 2 X;
[x  (1   )^ x]  (1   )^ x = x  (1   )^ x for all ; 2 [0;1]
One typical example of mixture space is the space of all simple lotteries over a set of
payos. Let L1 and L2 be two lotteries. Let L3 be the compound lottery consisting of
playing L1 with probability  and L2 with probability 1 . The lottery L3 is a mixture
of L1 and L2, L3 = L1  (1   )L2.
Denition 6 A function F : X ! R is continuous with respect to the mixture operation






Denition 7 A SO (W;U) is continuously linear in the mixture operation  with respect
to the subset e X  X if and only if, for all x; ^ x 2 X, ~ x 2 e X,  2 (0;1) and i 2 f1;2g
W(x)  W(^ x) () W





^ x  (1   )~ x

U(x;i)  U(^ x;i) () U





^ x  (1   )~ x;i

7and the three functions W, U(:;1) and U(:;2) are continuous with respect to the mixture
operation .
Whenever e X = X in Denition 7, we have the usual linearity in mixture property
that is satised by the expected utility representation, or Anscombe and Aumann (1963)
subjective expected utility. But Denition 7 can also encompass many other cases. For
instance, when discussing preferences over temporal lotteries (or temporal acts), the Kreps
and Porteus (1978) recursive expected utility or the subjective version thereof axiomatized
by Klibano and Ozdenoren (2007) satisfy linearity in mixture with respect to the subset
of temporal lotteries (or temporal acts) resolving in the last period of time.
Denition 7 also encompasses the property of certainty independence if e X is the set
of constant acts in an Anscombe-Aumann framework. Certainty independence is used to
characterize decision models that generalize subjective expected utility, for instance the
Maxmin Expected Utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), the Choquet Expected
Utility of Schmeidler (1989) and more generally the invariant biseparable preferences of
Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci (2004). Our result thus extends to these models
of choice and their dynamic extensions.
We also need to introduce the following denition:
Denition 8 Given a SO (W;U), a subset e X  X is said to be socially ambivalent if
there exists ~ x1 and ~ x2 2 e X such that
U(~ x1;1) < U(~ x1;2) and U(~ x2;1) > U(~ x2;2)
Social ambivalence is a condition on the utility possibilities set. It amounts to as-
suming that individuals' welfare ranks can be inverted, so that one individual is not
systematically better o from the SO's point of view. Social ambivalence is an ordi-
nal condition since two SOs with ordinally congruent interpersonal utility functions will
always agree on whether a subset is socially ambivalent.
Now we can state our result:
Proposition 1 Consider two Paretian SOs (WA;UA) and (WB;UB), who are contin-
uously linear in mixture with respect to a subset ~ X which is socially ambivalent for A.
If A is at least as inequality averse as B, then A and B have ordinally congruent social
evaluation functions.
Proof. Assume that WA(x)  WA(^ x). We need to show that WB(x)  WB(^ x).
If x Pareto dominates ^ x (in the broad sense that includes Pareto indierence) then
WB(x)  WB(^ x). So consider the case where x does not Pareto dominate ^ x and is not
Pareto indierent to it. Since WA(x)  WA(^ x) we can assume without loss of generality
8that4
UA(x;1) < UA(^ x;1)
UA(^ x;2) < UA(x;2)
Now consider the mixtures
x0 = x  (1   )~ x2
and
^ x0 = ^ x  (1   )~ x2
where ~ x2 is the social alternative described in Denition 8.
Since UA(~ x2;2) > UA(~ x2;1), and because UA(:;1) and UA(:;2) are continuous with
respect to , we have for  close enough to 0
UA(^ x0;1)  UA(^ x0;2)
By linearity in mixture, we also have UA(^ x0;2) < UA(x0;2) and UA(x0;1) < UA(^ x0;1).
Thus, for  close enough to 0,
UA(x0;1) < UA(^ x0;1)  UA(^ x0;2)  UA(x0;2)
Hence x0^ IUA^ x0. By linearity in mixture, it is also the case that WA(x0)  WA(^ x0).
Thus, by comparative inequality aversion, WB(x0)  WB(^ x0). Finally, the linearity in
mixture of B's preferences implies that WB(x)  WB(^ x).
Proposition 1 formalizes and generalizes Diamond's (1967) criticism of Harsanyi's
theorem. Diamond asserted that Harsanyi's criterion is unfair because it precludes redis-
tributions of welfare. The argument was based on particular cardinal utility functions for
the individuals. Proposition 1 does not make such assumptions: only ordinal representa-
tions are used. Besides, Proposition 1 claries the argument by showing that inequality
aversion is xed when comparable. Proposition 1 is also not conned to a particular
choice situation; it encompasses most frameworks of choice under uncertainty.
One crucial assumption to obtain the result is that the subset e X is socially ambivalent.
The following example illustrates that, when the assumption does not hold, it is possible
for a Paretian SO to be more inequality averse than another.
Example: Consider two SOs (WA;U) and (WB;U) using the same inter-
personal utility function U. A has a social evaluation function WA(x) =
A
1 U(x;1) + A
2 U(x;2) and B has a social evaluation function WB(x) =
B
1 U(x;1) + B




2 = 1. Assume also that
U(x;1) < U(x;2) for any x 2 X, so that X is not socially ambivalent.
4The case U
A(^ x;1) < U
A(x;1) and U
A(x;2) < U
A(^ x;2) can be dealt with using the same methods
as below. The only dierence is that we should then use ~ x1 rather than ~ x2 for dening x
0 and ^ x
0 in the
remainder of the proof.
9In that case, if A
1 > B
1 , then A is more inequality averse than B. Indeed,
for any x 2 X, any more unequal situation ^ x is such that U(^ x;1)  U(x;1) 
U(x;2)  U(^ x;2). If WA(^ x)  WA(x), then A
1 U(^ x;1) + A






















2 = 1. We hence nd that

^ xb IUx and WA(^ x) 
WA(x)

=) WB(^ x) > WB(x).
The conclusion of this section is that, whenever a subset of X is socially ambivalent,
we must weaken either the Pareto principle or (restricted) linearity in mixture in order
to escape the negative result of Proposition 1.
In Harsanyi's framework, it has been suggested that we should weaken linearity in
mixture (Diamond, 1967). Some attempts in this direction have actually been made
(Epstein and Segal, 1992; Grant, Kajii, Polak and Safra, 2006). A diculty with these
approaches is that they are prone to induce time inconsistent judgments under consequen-
tialist principles. The next section indeed shows that time consistency combined with
consequentialism and the Pareto principle prohibits comparisons in terms of inequality
aversion.
3.2 A dynamic framework
As explained in Johnsen and Donaldson (1985), linearity in mixture is not necessary to
ensure time consistencies of choices in a dynamic context. In this section, we directly
investigate the relationship between inequality aversion and time consistency in a simple
consequentialist intertemporal setting involving uncertainty. The setting extends to T
periods the model proposed by Johnsen and Donaldson (1985).
The time horizon is nite and each period denoted by t 2 f1; ;Tg. At each period,
any of S states of the world can arise. Let  = f1; ;Sg. For any arbitrary set K,
let F(K) be the set of acts dened as follows: F(K) = ff :  ! Kg. In period t, the
possible outcomes belong to the set Zt.
At each period, the decision maker must choose a course of action. We describe the
intertemporal choice problem recursively. We dene the sets of temporal acts as YT = ZT
and, for all t 2 f1; ;T   1g, Yt = Zt  F(Yt+1). For t > 1, we dene histories ht
as the collection of past outcomes: ht 2 Ht =
Qt 1
=1 Z. In a period t and given a
history ht, the decision maker is able to choose a course of action using the function
Uht;t : Yt ! R. The decision maker's dynamic preferences are fully represented by the
collection
n




Uht;t : t = 1; ;T;ht 2 Ht;
o
- in
short fUht;tg - a process of preferences.
This formalization implicitly assumes that the decision maker is consequentialist, in
the following usual sense: what might have happened in unrealized states of the world
does not impact preferences over the future. We also assume that preferences are state
independent: preferences in period t do not depend on which states of world have occurred
until period t included.
In line with Johnsen and Donaldson (1985), we consider the following additional prop-
erty of processes of preferences:
10Denition 9 A process of preferences fUht;tg is time consistent if, for any t 2 f1; ;T 



































In the current framework, there is no denition of the mixture operation that could
render linearity in mixture appealing. The rst period outcome is certain and cannot be
randomized. In this case, Johnsen and Donaldson (1985) explore several specications of
time-consistent preferences that are not the analog of the vNM model of choice. While
linearity in mixture is not required to obtain time consistency, we shall show that a result
similar to Proposition 1 can be obtained.
Now, consider two individuals 1 and 2, each endowed with a process of preferences
fUi
ht;tg. In the dynamic framework we have set up, we need to enlarge the notion of an
SO to include dynamic preferences.
Denition 10 An Social Observer is the combination of:
1. A collection of social evaluation functions Wht;t : Yt ! R, one for each t 2
f1; ;Tg and ht 2 Ht.
2. A collection of interpersonal utility functions Uht;t : X  f1;2g ! R one for each
t 2 f1; ;Tg and ht 2 Ht.
An SO is Paretian if the denition of a Paretian SO in Denition 3 applies to Wht;t
and Uht;t for each t 2 f1; ;Tg and ht 2 Ht. A SO f(Wht;t;Uht;t)g is time consistent if
each process of preferences Wht;t, Uht;t(:;1) and Uht;t(:;2) is time consistent.
In the present framework, X  Y1. Comparative inequality aversion is expressed in
terms of rst period social evaluation functions and interpersonal utility functions.
As above, an additional assumption must be made to obtain the analog of Proposition
1. The assumption guarantees that individuals' welfare rank can be inverted by ensuring
a particular outcome in suciently numerous states of the world.
Denition 11 A state of the world s 2  is socially revertible for an SO f(Wht;t;Uht;t)g
if, for all z1 2 Z1, there exist e y1
2 and e y2
2 in Y2 such that, whatever y2 2 Y2, if f1(s) =
^ f1(s) = y2, and, for all s0 6= s, f1(s0) = e y1



















11The existence of a socially revertible state of the world represents two ideas. First, this
state of the world is suciently unimportant (`suciently unlikely') so that what occurs
in other states of the world can fully x the relative situation of individuals. Second, it
is possible to invert individuals' welfare ranks. The second idea is closely related to the
existence of a socially ambivalent set of social alternatives.
Whenever there exists a socially invertible state of the world, we can obtain a result
similar to Proposition 1.





time consistent. If 1/ there exists a state of the world s 2  that is socially invertible
for f(WA
ht;t;UA
ht;t)g, and 2/ A is at least as inequality averse as B; then A and B have
ordinally congruent social evaluation functions after the initial period.
Proof. We rst prove that A and B must have the same preferences in period 2.
Consider any z1 2 Z1, y2 and ^ y2 in Y2. Assume that WA
z1;2(y2)  WA




If y2 Pareto dominates ^ y2 given z1, then WB
z1;2(y2)  WB
z1;2(^ y2). So consider the case





z1;2(^ y2;2) < UA
z1;2(y2;2)
Now consider the rst period acts y1 = (z1;f1) and ^ y1 = (z1; ^ f1) where f1(s) = y2,
^ f1(s) = ^ y2 and f1(s0) = ^ f1(s0) = e y2
2 for all s0 6= s, with e y2
2 dened as in Denition 11.
By time consistency, we have WA
1 (y1)  WA
1 (^ y1). By time consistency, it must also be
the case that UA
1 (y1;1) < UA
1 (^ y1;1) and UA
1 (^ y1;2) < UA
1 (y1;2). And, since s is socially
revertible for SO A, we have UA
1 (^ y1;2) > UA
1 (^ y1;1).
We end up with WA
1 (y1)  WA
1 (^ y1) and y1^ IUA
1 ^ y1 because
UA
1 (y1;1) < UA
1 (^ y1;1) < UA
1 (^ y1;2) < UA
1 (y1;2)
Comparative inequality aversion implies that WB
1 (y1)  WB
1 (^ y1). But given the




Then, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 1 If two SOs have time consistent preferences then:
If they have the same preferences in period 2 for any z1, then they have the same prefer-





z1;2(^ y2;1) and U
A
z1;2(^ y2;2) > U
A
z1;2(y2;2) can be treated similarly using e y
1
2
instead of e y
2
2 in the remainder of the proof.
12Proof. Assume that WA
ht;t(yt)  WA




Consider the subsequent periods acts dened inductively in the following way: y2 =
(z2;f2) with f2 2 F(Y3) and such that f2(s) = y3 for all s 2 ; and, 8 2 f4; ;tg,
y 1 = (z 1;f 1) with f 1 2 F(Y) and such that f 1(s) = y for all s 2 .
Similarly, dene the subsequent periods acts in the following way: ^ y2 = (z2; ^ f2) with
^ f2 2 F(Y3) and such that ^ f2(s) = ^ y3 for all s 2 ; and, 8 2 f4; ;tg, ^ y 1 =
(z 1; ^ f 1) with ^ f 1 2 F(Y) and such that ^ f 1(s) = ^ y for all s 2 .
By time consistency, WA
ht;t(yt)  WA
ht;t(^ yt) =) WA
z1;2(y2)  WA
z1;2(^ y2). Since A and B
have the same preferences in period 2, it is also the case that WB
z1;2(y2)  WB
z1;2(^ y2). The
time consistency of B's preferences hence yields WB
z1;2(y2)  WB




Obviously, Lemma 1 ends the proof.
Proposition 2 proves that two time consistent and Paretian SOs with comparable
degrees of inequality aversion must have the same preferences after the initial period.
Hence, after the initial period, inequality aversion is constrained. If we consider that
period 1 has already occurred, the result is the same as in Proposition 1, but it relies one
much weaker grounds, namely time consistency.
A few points deserve comment. First, we have assumed throughout the section that
S > 1. Otherwise, Assumption 2 cannot be stated. The fact that S > 1 is actually crucial
to obtain Proposition 2. It is perfectly possible to obtain more inequality averse Paretian
SOs in a deterministic intertemporal framework (see Atkinson and Bourguignon, 1982; or
Shorrocks, 1978).
A second point is that continuity is not necessary to obtain Proposition 2, contrary
to what was the case for Proposition 1. We do not need to make assumptions on the
structure of Zt. We make no assumptions on preferences except representability and time
consistency. Hence, Proposition 2 relies on rather weak grounds.
A third point is that state independence is also not necessary to obtain the result.
We have assumed state independence for convenience. But it is clear from the proof of
Proposition 2 that the result could be obtained in a state dependent framework provided
that Assumption 2 is true for any s 2 . More precisely, if all states of the world are
suciently unimportant so that guaranteeing given allocations in all other states allows
individuals' welfare ranks to be inverted, the proof in Proposition 2 ensures that the two
SOs have the same (state dependent) ordering in second period.
It is however crucial to assume that unrealized prospects do not matter in second
period. Without this consequentialist assumption, the result exposed in Proposition 2
cannot be obtained.
4 Conclusion
We have shown that the time consistency of choices in uncertain consequentialist frame-
works implies that we cannot nd two social Paretian social observers, with one being
more inequality averse than the other one. Two conditions are necessary to obtain this im-
possibility result: there must be some uncertainty, and we must be able to invert people's
welfare ranks in some social alternatives.
13We rst derived the result in the case of preferences that are linear in mixture. But, we
have also shown that even when mixture operations do not exist, the inequality aversion of
Paretian SOs is constrained. If we accept the rationality requirements of time consistency
and consequentialism, we are thus left with a con
ict between individualistic principles
and the willingness to reduce inequalities.
The reason is that the Pareto principle forces the social observer to respect individuals'
intertemporal choices. But the preferences of individuals in uncertain dynamic frameworks
directly impact the inequality of social outcomes. If we endorse the (ex-ante) Pareto
principle, the inequalities arising ex-post from people's choices must be accepted, how
broad they may be, and there is no room for expressing personal views on the acceptable
degree of inequality.
This result leaves us with a dicult dilemma. Either we follow a purely individualis-
tic path and forget about any considerations related to inequality aversion. Or we take
into account more redistributive views and have to intervene in individuals' intertempo-
ral decisions. This second path diers from the usual arguments in favor of paternalistic
interventions. The Pareto principle is often deemed unappealing when individuals make
`inappropriate' intertemporal decision, for instance when they make dynamically incon-
sistent choices, or when they have incorrect beliefs, etc. Here, paternalistic interference
arises from the ethically defendable concern for redistribution.
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